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nly about 30% of Africa has 
access to electricity, and 
transport costs in Africa are 
among the highest in the 
world. For the World Bank, 
the annual funding gap for infrastructure 
investment in Africa is US $31 billion. 
This gap however can be filled if 
the investments of natural resource 
concessionaires are leveraged and 
not planned in an enclave model. In 
resource-rich but infrastructure-poor 
Africa, natural resource concessionaires 
have traditionally developed railways, 
ports and power plants to serve their 
own needs. Africa has therefore often 
missed the opportunity of coordinating 
those large investments with national 
infrastructure planning and has failed 
to promote potential synergies and 
shared use of the privately developed 
infrastructure.
“As has been the case for many years,” 
says Helen Tarnoy, Executive Director 
of Aldwych International Ltd, “there 
is a wealth of potential opportunities 
for power developers owing to the 
substantial unmet demand for reliable 
power [including from the mining 
industry] across the continent. The 
opportunities are, however, not usually 
structured or packaged in any way by 
host governments or utilities.”
The potential to increase welfare gains 
by improved coordination between 
the government and companies is 
therefore tremendous: from avoiding the 
environmental damage of duplication of 
infrastructure between competitors to 
increasing the power supply to the grid, 
to unlocking the agriculture sector by 
providing cheaper transportation. 
“We have to create complementary 
infrastructure,” says Brian Molefe, 
CEO of South Africa’s Transnet, “and 
it is more likely to happen when the 
complementing interests outweigh the 
competing interests.” The cost savings 
are nevertheless not always obvious to 
the industry and barriers to shared use 
are heavy. Only a sound regulatory and 
policy framework can lift them.
KEY BARRIERS
Large infrastructure investments, such as 
in railways, ports, hydro-electric plants 
and power networks, exhibit natural 
monopoly features with high fixed costs 
and low operating costs. Consequently, 
the marginal cost is below the average 
cost and both decline as output expands. 
It causes a tricky situation where prices 
cannot be set at the marginal cost as 
required by social efficiency because 
prices must be at least equal to the 
average cost in order for the endeavour to 
be commercially viable. In this situation, 
it is generally more economically efficient 
for one firm to supply all the market’s 
demand. The flip side is that it ends up in 
exclusive access or monopoly pricing for 
infrastructure services. 
This explains why, in Africa, the 
traditional model, where the mine owner 
has been granted the vertically integrated 
concession of the railways (and thus is 
responsible for all the capital expenditure 
as well as the operations and maintenance 
of the assets), has not been successful 
in achieving shared use even if the state 
has kept the ownership of the tracks to 
preserve the “national interests.” 
Separating ownership of the mine, 
railway and port infrastructure is a 
more efficient structural solution: if 
the owner of the infrastructure assets 
is different from the mine investor, 
the owner is incentivised to maximise 
capacity utilisation, (provided that there 
is sufficient capacity), which should 
naturally result in shared use. 
Separating the ownership is 
particularly necessary in the cases 
in which the government is faced 
temporarily with one mining investor in 
a promising mining area that is bound to 
attract many other miners (e.g Liberia 
with Arcelor Mittal); or with major 
companies that can afford the total 
infrastructure costs and that do not see 
a business case for sharing the upfront 
capital costs (e.g Mozambique with Vale).
But this separation of ownership is 
not appealing to bulky miners, such as in 
coal and iron ore, which consider their 
infrastructures as part of an integrated 
system on which they want close control 
and zero coordination costs. 
Those coordination costs are particularly 
high in the case of sharing the railways 
with non-mineral users, such as farmers, 
given that they are generally low volume 
and dispersed and that the logistic 
solutions are not in place to make multi-
purpose infrastructure economically viable 
(warehouses, loading stations, feeder 
roads). 
In Australia, in the coal Hunter Valley, 
to cope with the coordination costs 
associated with separated ownership, an 
independent supply chain coordinator 
has been established to communicate 
with all participants in the supply 
chain to maximise overall throughput 
from the mine to the shipping entity. 
In Africa, such a critical coordinating 
body doesn’t exist. It is only in the DRC-
Zambian copper belt, where one single 
copper mine cannot afford a dedicated 
line, where the model of separating 
ownership has been adapted and that 
shared use is achieved in practice. 
An additional factor of high 
coordination costs is Africa’s single-track 
railway system, a remnant of colonial 
times, that mining companies rarely 
transform into double-track given the 
high investment.
More critically, mine investors generally 
have little regulatory incentive to design 
infrastructure with greater capacity 
than their mine’s production, such as 
establishing the right of way, bridging 
bases, making cuttings bigger, let alone 
constructing assets with overcapacity. 
Pointed questions regarding payment and 
allocation of capacity are bound to arise 
with generally no regulatory answers. 
For instance, in Richards Bay, while the 
railway is government-owned (Transnet), 
the coal terminal at the port is owned by 
the major coal mine investors, and it is 
therefore difficult for other coal producers 
to obtain capacity allocations at the port. 
Consequently, those other coal producers 
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do not seek access to the railways, so 
shared access is not achieved in practice. 
The same goes for the electricity 
generated by the mine: appropriate 
legislation for mining companies’ power 
generation does not always exist, or 
does not address the possibility of 
selling electricity to the grid, whereas 
the challenge for host countries with 
expensive grid electricity is to increase 
domestic supply. When there is no grid, 
the issue is even more acute. 
AngloGold Ashanti financed a new 
electric power line from Siguiri mine 
to the nearby town and provided two 
generators, giving the community 1.2MW. 
An engineer at one of leading mining 
firms insists that the crucial question is 
“who pays for the maintenance? Who 
ensures the financial sustainability? It 
can’t be the company.” 
Even where regulations mandate shared 
use or third party access, governments 
faced with monopolistic structures rarely 
have the bargaining power to impose such 
terms. To cope with this, countries like 
India or Brazil have adopted the golden 
share approach to influence or veto key 
strategic decisions. 
Finally, weakly drafted contractual 
language between states and private 
investors has proved ineffective in 
ensuring shared use or third party 
access, particularly when the designated 
infrastructure is capacity constrained. 
According to Miguel Peres, Managing 
Director, Mozambique at Brazil-based 
Odebrecht, the absence of an efficient 
statutory access regime or of an 
independent regulator to refer to, to 
regulate the monopolies, “is the number 
one barrier to shared use.” 
A CHANGE IS COMING
With the increase in commodity prices as 
well as the fact that the African continent 
has proved its attractiveness, the race 
to attract investments is coming to an 
end. Africa is becoming more demanding 
towards the investor. 
For instance, the Mozambique and 
Malawi governments have been reluctant 
to let Vale develop the Nacala Corridor 
given their intention to keep exclusive 
access. Mozambique’s Minister of 
Transportation and Communication, 
Paul Zucula, is adamant: Nacala’s rail 
and port concession granted to Vale 
“will also serve for the transportation 
of passengers and diverse merchandise, 
including livestock, in the agricultural 
region comprising the northern corridor.” 
In Liberia, the 2010 contract signed 
for the Putu mine requires the mine 
owner to build infrastructure with excess 
capacity and to provide 24/7 electricity 
to local communities in a ten-kilometre 
radius around the mine site.
In the DRC, in 2005, the public 
utility SNEL cancelled its deal with 
MagIndustries, whose plan was to 
rehabilitate turbines in exchange for 
power for its mining operations, when 
realising the unfavorable terms of the 
deal: negligible additional capacity for 
the country and the country had to pay 
the equivalent of a 26.5% financing 
interest for the Inga I and II upgrades.
In Guinea, with the new 2011 mining 
code, the government requires an equity 
stake in the infrastructure projects to 
limit the exercise of monopoly power.
In addition, governments are issuing 
new laws and regulations facilitating 
coordination and partnership with the 
companies. Mozambique recently passed 
a PPP law. In South Africa and Cameroon, 
reforms are underway to unbundle 
the power sector and encourage the 
participation of the mining industry’s 
own-generation in the power market. 
Furthermore, with the steady 
increase in commodity prices, mining 
has expanded and few mining projects 
happen in isolation, making the 
business case to coordinate and share 
infrastructure with other mineral users 
clearer. 
The Mbalam Iron Ore Railway 
developed by Sundance Resources in 
Cameroon and the Rio Tinto Simfer 
railways in Guinea, for example, are 
expected to open to other operators on 
a fee-for-service basis. Rio Tinto in the 
coal corridor in Mozambique is seeking 
to develop a new railway with other coal 
competitors under a multi-user scheme 
where capital costs are shared.
To implement multi-user platforms, 
“it is unrealistic to expect all projects 
within a region to be ready at the same 
time, therefore one needs an anchor 
project justifying the railway investment 
and the railway [must be] designed to be 
expanded to accommodate other projects 
as they develop” says Ewen Wigley, Head 
of Corporate Development at Africa Iron 
Ore Group.
PROPER PLANNING IS 
NEEDED
Independent from a weak regulatory 
framework or companies’ reluctance 
towards shared use is the issue of the 
proximity of population and activity 
centres. For instance, with the support 
of the World Bank, the government of 
Madagascar created a joint venture with 
Rio Tinto to develop the port of Ehoala. 
Rio Tinto’s operated port is multi-purpose 
but “as the port is remote from other 
economic activity, container-shipping 
activity is extremely modest (15,000 TEU 
over the past three years), so in effect it 
only serves Rio Tinto’s needs,” contends 
Henry Pringle, a port specialist.
Therefore, requiring shared use and open 
access from mining investments cannot 
save on the effort of national infrastructure 
planning to identify where the public-
private coordination makes more sense. 
This planning effort seldom happens in 
Africa but is indispensable to unlock the 
economic potential of the continent.
To help this planning effort, a ten-year 
aspirational map can be a useful tool that 
would indicate the infrastructure necessary 
for national development by 2023, and 
would anticipate the demand for various 
forms of infrastructure by assessing the 
potential economic activity.     
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“[Complimentary 
infrastructure] is more 
likely to happen when the 
complimenting interests 
outweigh the competing 
interests”
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